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Abstract 
This paper analyzes platforms and rejections in two-sided markets with network 
externalities, using the specific context of a payment card association.  We study the 
cooperative antitrust determination of the interchange fee by member banks.  We use a 
framework in which banks and merchants may have market power and consumers and 
merchants decide rationally on whether to buy or accept a payment card developed by 
Rochet and Tirole (2002).  After drawing the welfare implications of a cooperative 
determination of the interchange fee and antitrust conducts, we describe in detail the factors 
affecting merchant resistance, compare cooperative and for-profit business models, and 
make a first cut in the analysis of system competition. 
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1. Introduction 
The rapid growth in the use of payment cards is a striking feature of modern economies.  
It is characterized by the existence of strong network externalities: In a payment card 
transaction, the consumer’s bank, called the issuer, and the merchant’s bank, the acquire, 
must cooperate to enable the transaction.  Two successful not-for-profit joint ventures, 
Visa U.S.A., Inc. ("Visa U.S.A." or “Visa”) and MasterCard International, Inc. 
("MasterCard"), have designed a set of rules to govern the “interconnection” between their 
members: (i) Interchange fee, (ii) Honor-all-cards rule, and (iii) No-surcharge rule.  
Further more, two successful for-profit firms, American Express and Discover, are the same 
rules. 
Some of these institutional features have gained wide acceptance and rationalized.  To see 
the benefits of a centrally determined interchange fee cum the honor-all-cards rule, it 
suffices to envision the complexity of bilateral bargaining among thousands of banks as 
well as the cost for issuers of informing consumers about the set of merchants with whom 
an agreement has been reached.  The latter transactions costs could be avoided by keeping 
the honor-all-cards rule while letting issuers and acquires set their pairwise interchange fees. 
However, an individual issuer would then be able to impose an arbitrarily high interchange 
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fee, since the acquirer would then face the grim choice between accepting this fee on a 
fraction of her payments and exiting the industry altogether.  Individual issuers would 
become bottlenecks, and their free riding would dissuade acquirers from entering the 
industry.  
Two features of these interconnection rules are viewed with suspicion by competition 
authorities and by some economists. (See, e.g., Frankel (1998) and Carlton and Frankel 
(1995).)  First, the no-surcharge rule is sometimes view as an attempt by payment card 
systems to leverage their market power by forcing more card transactions than is efficient.  
Second, the collective determination of the interchange fee is seen by some as a potential 
instrument of collusion.  Recently, after all, we obtained a court decision on an antitrust 
law suit about the card systems’ exclusionary agreement. 
The U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") brought a civil enforcement action challenging the 
organizational structure of two of the nation's four major payment card systems.  The 
complaint charged that MasterCard and Visa U.S.A., which are organized as joint ventures 
owned by their member banking institutions, conspired to restrain trade in two ways: (1) By 
enacting rules permitting a member-owner of one to function as a director of the other (an 
arrangement the government described as "dual governance") (Count I); and (2) by 
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enacting and enforcing "exclusionary rules," which prohibit their member banks from 
issuing American Express ("Amex") or Discover cards (Count II).  
 
After a 34-day trial, the court, in a commendably comprehensive and careful opinion, ruled 
in the defendants’ favor as to dual governance (Count I).  As to Count II, however, the 
court held that Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard violated the antitrust act by enforcing their 
respective versions of the exclusionary rule, barring their member banks from issuing 
Amex or Discover cards. The court further held that Visa International ("Visa 
International"), which owns the Visa brand, licenses it to Visa U.S.A., and exercises certain 
governance powers over Visa U.S.A., was liable for participating in Visa U.S.A.'s violation. 
The court ordered the exclusionary rules revoked and permanently enjoined all three 
defendants from promulgating similar rules in the future.  (See generally United States v. 
Visa U.S.A., Inc., 163 F.Supp.2d 322 (S.D.N.Y.2001) (opinion and Proposed Final 
Judgment); United States v. Visa U.S.A., Inc., 183 F.Supp.2d 613 (S.D.N.Y.2001) 
(modifications to Proposed Final Judgment).)  
The defendants, MasterCard, Visa U.S.A., and Visa International, brought appeal. Visa 
U.S.A. and MasterCard argue that the district court erred in its conclusion that their 
 4
respective exclusionary rules violate the Sherman Act. Visa International contends there 
was no adequate basis to hold it liable for Visa U.S.A.'s violation1.  
The U. S. Court of appeals for the second circuit affirms the judgment (hereinafter, the 
“Judgment”).  
This article analyzes the validity of the concern.  To provide a policy analysis, it develops 
a normative framework of the determination of an efficient interchange fee and of impact of 
the antitrust agreement.  The strength of this paper’s approach relative to the previous 
literature (contrary to Rochet and Tirole (2002)) is that we build in antitrust effects and are 
able to show a proper welfare analysis.  That literature focused on the payment system 
strategic mechanism based on the market power premises.   Namely, it assumes that 
issuers have some market power, while acquires are in competitive (no market power) 
alternatively.  It seems to be a kind of general situation, but is not a good analogy.  The 
similar argument in the courtroom is not accepted with these mentioned:  
 “Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard, however, are not single entities; they are 
consortiums of competitors. They are owned and effectively operated by some 
20,000 banks, which compete with one another in the issuance of payment cards 
and the acquiring of merchants' transactions. These 20,000 banks set the policies 
                                                   
1 This count is omitted in this paper. 
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of Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard. These competitors have agreed to abide by a 
restrictive exclusivity provision to the effect that in order to share the benefits of 
their association by having the right to issue Visa or MasterCard cards, they must 
agree not to compete by issuing cards of Amex or Discover. The restrictive 
provision is a horizontal restraint adopted by 20,000 competitors.2”  
This article is organized as follows:  Section 2 describes the working of the payment card 
industry and antitrust conducts.  Section 3 develops the model.  Section 4 re-interprets of 
the model under antitrust conducts.  Section 5 compares the findings with those in the 
prior literatures.  Section 6 summarizes the main insights and discusses some topics for 
future research. 
 
2. Working of the payment card industry 
A card payment is a service offered to two parties (the cardholder and the merchant) jointly 
by two other parties (the issuer and the acquirer).  The left side of Figure 1 shows the costs 
and benefits attached to a card transaction.  The total cost of this service is the sum of the 
issuer’s cost CI and the acquirer’s cost CA.  Suppose that the benefit accruing to the 
cardholder (or buyer) for the marginal use of a payment card is equal to bB.  Similarly, the 
                                                   
2 See the Judgment: III The Defendants' Arguments, A Harms to Competition, Paragraph 
Five.  
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benefit to the merchant (or seller) of this marginal use of a payment card is bS.  The 
benefits bi and costs ci referred to above are net benefits and costs.  The cardholder and the 
merchant must compare the utilities they get by using payment cards with those associated 
with alternative payment methods (cash, checks, etc.).  At the social optimum, the total 
benefit of the marginal transaction, bB+bS, is equal to its total cost, CI+CA≡c.  The left 
side of Figure 1 also features the payments from end users to intermediaries: cardholders 
pay f to issuers and merchants pay merchant discount m to acquirers.  
One of the features of payment systems is its two-sidedness.  Whether the transactions 
occur within a cooperative undertaking as studied here, or through a for-profit company 
playing both roles of issuer and acquirer, the system must attract both sides of the market.  
Any contemplated increase in the merchant discount must carefully consider the likely 
merchant resistance, and similarly on the cardholder side. 
The key feature of payment systems is antitrust conducts.  As above mentioned, the 
issuers and the acquirers are consolidated among the 20,000 banks and Visa U.S.A. and 
MasterCard in order to optimal set maximal benefits of the consolidations through rejecting 
business agreement with a for-profit company.  The consolidated issuers and acquirers 
have market power in the payment systems. 
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3. A model of the payment card industry under the antitrust conducts 
Some models assume that issuers have some market power, while acquirers are perfectly 
competitive.  (See Evans and Schmalensee (1999) and Rochet and Tirole (2002).)  The 
cause and the extent of market power is highly country-specific.  In the model below, we 
assume that issuers have some market power.  Then we analyze the antitrust effect, also. 
Our model is based on the model of Rochet and Tirole’s (2002).  Accordingly, most of the 
Issuer Acquirer 
Customer Merchant 
Pays p+f 
(f: customer 
fee) 
Pays p – a 
(a: interchange fee) 
Pays p – m 
(m: merchant 
discount) 
Sells good at price p 
Net cost CI Net cost CA 
Marginal net 
benefit bB 
Marginal net 
benefit bS 
FIGURE 1 
Antitrust conducts 
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assumptions such as a fixed volume of transactions, normalized to one transactions, etc. are 
taken over.  For example, CI and CA denote the per-transaction costs respectively, the 
interchange fee is denoted a, and the merchant discount is denoted m (as following Section 
2).  The customer’s yearly fee is f, and it is no variable fee.  Let bB and bS denote the 
customer’s and the merchant’s benefit. 
 
Consumer side: Let E(bB |bB>=bB*) denote the expected benefit enjoyed by an average 
cardholder, when consumers with type bB≧bB* purchase the card, and those with type 
bB<bB* do not. 
 
Issuer side: Let D(f) denote the total demand for cards, and β(f) the average card holder 
benefit.  
Let f = f*(CI – a) denote the equilibrium customer fee. 
Then the important assumption goes:  The oligopolistic equilibrium fee, f*(CI – a), is 
defined for all values of the interchange fee a (even a >CI) and decreases with it.  Each 
member bank’s profit increases with the interchange fee a. 
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Acquirer side: Acquirers face per-transaction cost CA and are competitive.  For 
interchange fee a, they offer merchant discount m given by m = a+CA. 
 
Merchant side:  Merchants I = 1, 2 set their retail prices (p1, p2) noncooperatively as in 
Hotelling’s model. 
 
Timing: The timing is as follows: 
Stage 1: The interchange fee is set (by collusively). 
Stage2: Issuers set fees for their customers, who elect or not to have a card. Merchants 
decide whether to accept payment cards, and then set their retail prices. 
Stage 3: Customers observe the retail prices and whether cards are accepted, and pick a 
store.  If the selected store does not accept payment cards or if the consumer does not own 
a payment card, the consumer must incur his opportunity cost (bB) of using the alternative 
payment method; similarly, the merchant incurs opportunity cost bS. 
 
Then â is the level of the interchange fee at which the net cost to the merchants is equal to 
the average cardholder benefit. 
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Last, in order to analyze how merchant resistance is affected by the diffusion of cards in the 
population, let us parameterize the oligopolistic equilibrium fee by a number τ that 
increases when competition among issuers becomes more intense: f = f*(CI – a,τ), with f* 
decreasing inτ. 
 
4. Re-interpretation of the model 
After these preparations, Rochet and Tirole show and prove their Proposition 1, which is as 
follows: 
Proposition 1. (i) Under the no-surcharge rule, there exists an equilibrium in which all 
merchants accept the card if and only if a≦â. 
(ii) As competition among issuers intensifies, merchant resistance increases, i.e., the 
maximal interchange fee â decreases. 
 
A little easy way to think is the other side of the meanings.  We are supposed to think the 
issuer as the consolidation among the acquirers.  Once the issuer is thought of as 
composition of acquirers, then the cooperated price (customer fee; f) could be an optimal 
level in the payment card consumer market.  There exist if and only if an optimal level of 
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the fee, which is the issuer=acquirer monopoly level against the consumer and the merchant.  
The level is higher than the Cournot (or Bertrand) competition level of the acquirers.  It is 
easy to think that there exists the internal distributive level of the fee in the collusive 
system.  
And if competition rises among the banks in the collusive system, the total payoff of the 
consolidation would decrease. 
 
Rochet and Tirole’s Proposition 2 illustrates the externalities, which describes strategic 
complementarity.  This feature is a kind of credit card service’s character   The more 
convenient we use a credit card, the more merchants accept a credit card, and vice versa.  
This finding is approved in the court (including even the equilibrium of card rejection, such 
as “(1) Network-level costs are so high that banks and merchants cannot provide these 
services for themselves.”3). 
 
Rochet and Tirole’s Proposition 3 deals with interchange fee under the no-surcharge rule4.  
                                                   
3 The Judgment: I. Relevant Markets and Market Power. 
4 Rochet and Tirole’s Proposition 3: Under the no-surcharge rule, the issueres’ preferred 
interchange fee is equal to â . 
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The Proposition 3 means that there can be setting an optimal internal distribution level and 
the effects on merchant side (overprovision).  Rochet and Tirole’s Proposition 4 shows 
that issuers’ perfect two-part tariffs implication.  It mentions that variable payments reduce 
merchant resistance if and only if the interchange fee exceeds the issuer cost.  And both 
associations and a proprietary system enhance a positive externality by using some policies.  
As for Rochet and Tirole’s Proposition 5, they introduce information incompleteness of 
consumer, and show existence of social optimal interchange fee in general condition . 
 
The other matter of interest is Rochet and Tirole’s Proposition 6, it states that: 
In the absence of transaction costs associated with the merchants’ charging different prices, 
(i) For a given interchange fee, allowing card surcharges raises the merchant price for 
cardholders and lowers it for noncardholders. 
(ii) When the no-surcharge rule is lifted, the interchange fee is neutral and there is an 
underprovision of card services. 
(iii) Lifting the no-surcharge rule reduces social welfare in case (i) of Provision 3.  Lifting 
                                                                                                                                                           
(i) If CI+CA-bS≦f*(CI - â ), then the socially optimal interchange fee is equal to the issuers’ 
preferred interchange fee. 
(ii) If CI+CA-bS>f*(CI - â ), interchange fee set by a payment card association controlled by 
issuers leads to an overprovision of payment card services. 
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the no-surcharge rule may increase or reduce social welfare in case (ii) of Provision 35. 
In the antitrust conduct situation, the context means a problem of double marginalization6.   
The no-surcharge rule prohibits a merchant from conducting price discrimination as a 
monopolist against a consumer.  If the no-surcharge rule is lifted, then the merchant who 
has a market power in the oligopoly situation can raise the price as long as the marginal 
cost equal to marginal revenue (This is above (i) description.).  It cause no effect on the 
interchange fee which is like cost to the merchant ((ii)’s description).  Then if the 
merchant conduct marginalization of their action, social welfare’s direction depends on the 
situation before and after7 ((iii)’s description). 
 
Regarding system competition which is thought of two (or more) associations, Rochet and 
Tirole deliberately note that system competition may reduce social welfare by lowering the 
interchange fee.  And they express that they only want to warn against “natural 
conclusions” and to stimulate further research on this very interesting topic. 
                                                   
5 See footnote four. 
6 See Tirole (1998), p174. 
7 If the limitation is constrain rigidly, the merchant’s marginalization cause dead weight 
loss under the merchant side monopoly.  If not, the merchant’s perfect discrimination may 
cause to raise social welfare through rising merchant’s benefit. 
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The last thing worth to be mentioned is Rochet and Tirole’s Proposition 7.  Before 
Proposition 7, they note that a key difference between the for-profit and the cooperative 
paradigms is that the former has two separate instruments and optimizes over the merchant 
discount and the customer fee, while in the latter the customer fee is determined by issuer 
competition once the merchant discount/interchange fee is set.  Then, Proposition 7 states 
that: Let mP and mC denote, respectively, the merchant discount chosen (directly) by a 
proprietary system and (indirectly) by a cooperative banks. 
(i) When issuer competition is described by Hotelling model, mC<mP, under the (weak) 
assumption that the elasticity of merchant acceptance is small when m is outside the 
competitive region. 
(ii) Linear demands, mC<mP. 
(iii) When issuers compete a la Cournot and demands are linear, mC=mP. 
In the antitrust context, including the for-profit entity into the model leads to leak profits to 
the for-profit entity.  The conduct to obtain profits for for-profit entity cause to decrease 
mC rather than mP in the oligopolistic situation.  It is important to consider that we 
compare the welfare of the competition of a proprietary system with that of the cooperative 
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system.  
 
5. Comparison with the literature 
The theoretical and empirical analyses of the United States’ credit card market were 
initiated by Baxter (1983) and Ausubel (1991), similarly.  Then several articles have been 
analyzed from the viewpoints of comparison of the ATM networks8.   
Baxter (1983) is the standard reference.  Baxter assumed that perfectly competitive 
paradigm then performed the normative analysis of finding the optimal interchange fee. 
Schmalensee (2002) made analysis of market power issues.  Schmalensee considered that 
the interchange fee balances charges between cardholders and merchants under imperfect 
competition, and that economic basis for proprietary payment systems and cooperative 
bank card systems. 
Then, Rochet and Tirole (2002) showed identification of the determinants of merchant 
resistance and analysis of the impact of the no-surcharge rule, as well as a comparison 
between the privately optimal interchange fee and the socially optimal one.  In a follow-up 
article (Rochet and Tirole (2003)), they provide a general analysis of platform competition 
                                                   
8 These are mentioned in Rochet and Tirole (2002). 
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and compare price structures under platform competition with those under a monopoly 
platform. 
We have pointed out the lack of the antitrust conducts in the framework of Rochet and 
Tirole (2002), and show the simple re-interpretations of the credit card industry. 
Another interesting topic is excess interest rates.  Ausubel (1991) pointed out the interest 
rate of credit card market in the 1980’s are sticky over the three times or five times of the 
financial market interest rates.  This indication leads to several similar studies.  Calem 
and Mester (1995) considered that under the high interest rate of credit card, it is necessary 
for consumers to take a search cost and a switching cost for the appropriate card.  They 
pointed out that credit card issuers offer high rate to keep away consumer’s adverse 
selection, and provided that this situation made the high interest rate of credit card ruling 
out perfect competition in the market.  Stango (2000) confirmed that this high interest rate 
of credit card situation had been maintained by early 1990’s and that there was non price 
competition between incumbents and new comers.  Knittel and Stango (2003) argued that 
the non bounded ceiling limitation of the interest rate of credit card functioned one of focal 
point for the card issuers, and that the focal point made tacit collusion of the interest rate. 
The situations mentioned by Ausubel and others are explained by some market power 
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caused by antitrust conducts of the cooperative bank card systems.  Market power may be 
presumed if the entity controls a large enough share of the relevant market.  The court 
stated that: 
 “Indeed, despite recent increases in both networks' interchange fees, no 
merchant had discontinued acceptance of their cards.  In addition, the court 
inferred market power from the defendants' large shares of a highly concentrated 
market: In 1999, Visa U.S.A. members accounted for approximately 47% of the 
dollar volume of credit and charge card transactions, while MasterCard members 
accounted for approximately 26%.  (American Express accounted for 20%; 
Discover, for 6 %.)9” 
While competition among (and within) these networks is robust at the issuing level (where 
20,000 separate issuers compete to provide products to consumers), at the network level 
(where four major networks seek to sell their technical, infrastructure, and financial 
services to issuer banks) competition has been seriously damaged by the defendants' 
exclusionary rules.  The market power is regarded as one of the main reason of the high 
interest rate of credit card in the 1980’s and early 1990’s. 
 
                                                   
9 The Judgment; I. Relevant Markets and Market Power, Paragraph Five. 
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6. Summary 
This article has pointed out a leitmotif of economic effect of antitrust conducts in payment 
card systems and studied Rochet and Tirole (2002).  They state that in the absence of 
unobserved heterogeneity among merchants, an increase in the interchange fee increases 
the usage of payment cards, as long as the interchange fee does not exceed a threshold level 
at which merchants no longer accept payment cards.  Indeed, there is this threshold in the 
model, but this threshold is a kind of internal optimal re-distribution point in antitrust 
collusion between many acquirers and association type issuers. 
And Rochet and Tirole mentioned meaningful role played by merchant resistance.  
Payment card systems can exploit each merchant’s eagerness to obtain a competitive edge 
over other merchants, and this searching has two benefits for systems: it forces merchants 
to internalize card holders’ convenience benefit, and it offsets the underprovision of cards 
by issuers with market power.  From the viewpoint of antitrust context, merchant 
resistance means cost of buying for acquires and issuers collusion.  Therefore, if the cost 
is low (in the situation of a merchant has no market power and is on the competitive edge), 
payment card systems obtain merits from the low cost and can pass through the benefits to 
the consumer side.  Additionally, if system competition happens, merchant resistance 
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(selling power10) would increase and the system’s benefit goes down. 
If the no-surcharge rule is lifted and price discrimination is costless to merchants, the 
interchange fee no longer affects the level of payment card services.  The merchant price 
for cardholders is increased and that for noncardholders is decreased. 
The payment card industry has received scant theoretical attention, and it will not come as a 
surprise to the reader that more research is warranted.  This article argued that the 
framework developed here can be used as a building block to analyze more general 
situations with acquirer market power and distorted competing means of payments, 
including antitrust conducts in which is employed by Visa U.S.A. and MasterCard.  The 
payment card industry offers many other fascinating topics for theoretical and empirical 
investigation, such as the competition between associations and proprietary, the 
development of e-commerce, and the comparison of world payment card systems.  The 
respect thing is that we find out that who is decision-maker, jointly or a form of association, 
and we are aware of including antitrust viewpoints. 
This argument can expand a broader perspective.  Consider the pooling association 
containing the music copyrights from each musician.  The association has two sided effect 
                                                   
10 Using these words, contrary to “buying power.” 
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similar to the payment card systems.  It is common to get in the licensing fee of music, 
however if we can adopt this article’s framework then the association is suspect to be an 
illegal under the antitrust law11.  More generally, most markets with network externalities 
and industrial association involve multiple sides and the choice of price structure and 
antitrust problems.  It can think of internet operating and keeping the security association, 
international banking association, media advertisers and real estate agency assessment 
association and so forth.  What is important is real insights and recognition of positive 
reality. 
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